In contrast to most other countries, Chinese foreign class B shares trade at an average discount of about 60 percent to the prices at which domestic A shares trade. We argue that one reason for the large price discount of B shares is because foreign investors have less information on Chinese stocks than domestic investors. We develop a model, incorporating both informational asymmetry and market segmentation, and derive a relative pricing equation for A shares and B shares. We show theoretically that an A share index security, tradable by foreigners, increases the liquidity of B shares. Our empirical study of Chinese stocks supports the predictions of our model. Specifically, we show that our model-based proxies for informational asymmetry explain a significant portion of the cross-sectional variation of the B share discounts.
INTRODUCTION
The finance literature has, in recent years, documented many cases where foreign class shares (i.e., shares offered to foreign investors) trade at a premium relative to domestic shares (Hietala, 1989; Bergstrom, Rydqvist and Sellin, 1993; Bailey and Jagtiani, 1994; Stulz and Wasserfallen, 1995) . 2 However, the reverse case---where foreign shares trade at a price discount relative to domestic shares---has received less attention. An example is the Chinese stock market, where domestic investors can only trade A (local) shares, while foreign investors are restricted to trading B (foreign) shares.
3 Although the two share classes are identical with respect to shareholder rights, such as voting and profit sharing rights, foreign investors pay only a small fraction of the prices that local investors pay for identical stocks (Bailey, 1994; Wo, 1997; Chen and Su, 1998) .
In this paper, we examine, both theoretically and empirically, the pricing of dual listed
Chinese stocks. Consistent with the previous literature, we find that B shares trade at a substantial discount relative to A shares. Specifically, the daily mean and median price discounts for the B shares in our sample, for the period January 1994 to December 1996, are 58.68 percent and 60.71 percent, respectively. We argue that the discount exists because foreign investors have less information about local firms, relative to domestic investors. We develop a theoretical model, incorporating both asymmetric information and market segmentation, and 2 derive a relative pricing formula for A and B shares. In the theoretical model, we also explore the effect of introducing index securities on the liquidity of the B share market. In our empirical tests, we construct a proxy for informational asymmetry, and provide evidence in support of our theoretical predictions.
Why do foreign shares trade at such large discounts in China, and at a premium in other markets? Many of the usual explanations for price differences between domestic and foreign shares do not appear to be important for China. Foreign investors face low barriers to trading B shares, relative to domestic investors trading A shares. There is no time lag in trading between the domestic and the foreign shares; and neither dividends nor capital gains are taxed in China.
Incomplete diversification on the part of domestic investors and foreign ownership restrictions are more likely to lead to price premia rather than discount for the B shares. 4 We argue that foreign investors find it more difficult to acquire and assess information about local Chinese firms, relative to domestic investors. These difficulties are due to language barriers, different accounting standards, and lack of reliable information about the local economy and firms (Kaye and Cheng, 1992; Sze, 1993) . Many listed B share firms do not fully and promptly disclose all material changes in their business conditions, and published statements are not always prepared according to international accounting standards. While these problems face 3 all investors, they are worse for foreign investors since local investors may be able to tap informal local information sources that are unavailable to nonresident investors.
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While information asymmetries may be present in other countries, they are particularly relevant for China. For one thing, unlike countries such as Finland, Sweden and Switzerland, where foreign shares trade at a premium, China is an emerging stock market. In fact, China had no stock markets till 1990, and B shares were not traded till 1992. In common with other emerging markets, Chinese stock exchanges lack certain features that could otherwise mitigate information asymmetry for foreigners. For example, real-time market information and B share prices are not available and Chinese managers do not recognize the importance of disclosure (Sze, 1993) . Further, share manipulation and insider trading are considered to be rampant and investor protections rights are not legally codified (Kaye and Cheng, 1992) . While the severity of these problems may have declined over time, they continue to be relevant.
As indirect evidence in favor of the information asymmetry hypothesis, we note that, in our sample, the mean daily price discount for the B shares listed on the Shanghai exchange is 65.62 percent, compared to 48.71 percent for B shares trading on Shenzhen. One interpretation for this difference is that there is less information available about Shanghai-listed firms. The Shanghai exchange is dominated by former State-owned enterprises, whereas the Shenzhen market features more joint venture companies, many involving Hong Kong Chinese investors.
As Sze (1993) points out, the former State-owned enterprises are most likely to suffer from poor accounting and disclosure standards, whereas many joint venture companies are managed by the Hong Kong partners.
We derive a simple asset pricing model, based on Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , that incorporates both asymmetric information and market segmentation in a noisy rational expectations framework. Domestic investors trade A shares only, and have private information about the future returns of the domestic stock. Foreign investors trade B shares and foreign stocks, but do not have any special information about the domestic stock. However, foreign investors observe the current price of A shares, which is informative of both A and B share returns. Hence, the A and B share markets are linked in information, although they are segmented in trading.
Based on our model, we derive a relationship between the prices of A and B shares that depends on both the degree of asymmetric information and foreign investors' diversification benefits (since the B share market expands foreign investors' opportunity sets). When there is no asymmetric information, our model predicts a premium for foreign B shares, as in previous models of market segmentation. With severe asymmetric information, however, B shares may trade at a discount relative to A shares. The degree of information asymmetry is negatively related to the covariance of the returns between B and A shares, and positively related to the variance of B share returns.
We extend the model to allow for the possibility of an index security based on the B shares. 6 Sze (1993) reports that foreign investors recommend such a B share index to enhance the liquidity of the B share market. Subrahmanyam (1991) , and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) show that uninformed traders can reduce their losses to informed traders by trading an index security, or a basket of securities. We show, however, that the introduction of a B share index does not affect investors' demand for shares, nor the prices of A and B shares. The reason is 5 that, since A and B share markets are segmented in trading, the B share index does not change the degree of informational asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors. As an alternative, we propose an index security of A shares that can be traded by foreign investors (although the individual A shares are still restricted to domestic investors). We show that introduction of the A share index increases trading volume and decreases the price discount in the B share market.
In our empirical study, we use a sample of 39 dually listed firms on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges to test the relationship between information asymmetry and the price discount on the B shares. We use the coverage of Chinese companies in the English press as an (inverse) measure of information asymmetry, since firms with wider coverage in the media may be easier to monitor. We find preliminary evidence consistent with the asymmetric information hypothesis: the magnitude of the B share price discount is negatively related to the number of news reports in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets; and, second, there are more stocks for which the A share returns lead the B share returns, than the other way around.
Next, we specify a cross-sectional regression, based on our theoretical model, to explain the determinants of the B share price discounts. We relate the discount to the covariance between A share and B share returns, the variance of B share returns, and the media coverage variable---all proxies for informational asymmetry. We include the covariance between B share returns and the S&P 500 index to measure the diversification effect. We also control for the relative supplies of the A and B shares and the size (i.e., market capitalization) of the stock. The results are consistent with our theory. The media coverage and the B share return variance variables are highly significant, but the diversification variable is not. In addition, firm size and 6 We thank the referee for suggesting this extension to us. 6 the relative supply of A and B shares are also significant. When we include an exchange dummy, our specification explains 67 per cent of the cross-sectional variance of the B share discounts.
Other papers have also studied the Chinese A and B share markets. Bailey (1994) finds preliminary evidence for foreign share discounts. Wo (1997) conducts a bivariate Granger causality test of A and B share returns and finds evidence of two way information flows between the markets for his sample period (January 1993 to October 1995). Chen and Su (1998) find that the A and B share markets are not perfectly integrated. They use the returns on the Chinese stock index as a proxy for informational asymmetry and find that it is positively related to the difference in A share and B share returns. However, the Chinese stock index return is more reasonably interpreted as a proxy for local market risk, instead of informational asymmetry.
Further, since local investors are more exposed to local market risk, A share returns are more sensitive to the local index than B share returns. Unlike the current paper, none of the above papers test for informational asymmetry based on a theoretical model, nor do they construct direct empirical proxies for informational asymmetry (such as our media coverage variable).
In related literature, Errunza and Losq (1985) show that securities inaccessible to a subset of investors require greater risk premia. Merton (1987) models a limiting case where investors only invest in a subset of available securities with which they are familiar, because of high costs of gathering and processing data. In a recent paper, Stulz and Wasserfallen (1995) demonstrate that the deadweight costs (including information costs) for holding risky assets differ across investors and across countries, causing demand functions for domestic shares to differ between domestic and foreign investors. Brennan and Cao (1997) 
where φ is the true return of the asset and ε, γ are error terms. We assume that domestic investors observe φ while foreigner investors can only observe the prices p a , p b and p c .
Below, we specify some properties of the random variables. φ, ε and γ have a trivariate normal distribution with variances Var(φ), Var(ε) , and Var(γ), respectively. Also: 
A. The Relative Pricing Model With No Index Security
In this section, we assume that there is just one stock traded in each market. Hence, there are no index securities. An investor of type i, i = a, b, chooses the number of shares of the risk-free asset M i and the number of shares of the risky asset n i to maximize the expected utility of his end-of-period wealth, conditional on his information set I i and subject to his budget constraint. We normalize so that the price of the risk-free asset is one.
12 Let an investor of type i have initial endowment assets w 0i . Thus, a domestic investor
subject to the domestic budget constraint:
where the end-of-period wealth of the domestic investor is:
It is well-known that the expected utility of domestic investors can be expressed as
We show (in Appendix I) that maximizing the expected utility with respect to n a leads to the following demand function for domestic investors:
The demand for A shares depends positively on the information φ and negatively on the price, the degree of risk-aversion, and the conditional volatility of returns. Because trading in domestic class shares is completely separated from trading in the foreign class shares, domestic shares are subject only to domestic market risk. In other words, the A shares are priced as if the B shares do not exist.
Let P a * (.,.) be some particular price function of (x a ,φ) such that u a and P a * are jointly normally distributed (we will prove that such a price function exists). A foreign investor
subject to the foreign budget constraint:
where the end-of-period wealth of the foreign investor is:
We see that there is an additional component to the foreigners' budget constraint in (12) and (13), since they have the option to invest in the risky asset in their own market as well as
Chinese B shares. We show (in Appendix I) that the demand function (n b ) of foreign investors for the B shares is:
The demands of foreign investors depend both on the actual price of A and B shares and the A share price function, since the latter is informative about the expected return and variance of the B shares. In addition, the demand for B shares depends on the demand for C shares and the covariance between the returns of the B share market and the C-share market. If the covariance is negative, then investing in B shares provides diversification benefits for foreign investors, and the B share demand is higher as a result.
Finally, foreign investors' demand for the purely foreign asset n c is:
The equilibrium price distributions are functions P a (x a ,φ),
and
) such that, in each market, the demand for shares equals the supply available for every realization of φ and x i , i=a,b,c. Note that P a * is the A share price function conjectured by the foreign investors, whereas P a is the true A share price function. In equilibrium, the particular 14 price function P a * conjectured by foreign investors is, in fact, the function P a (x a ,φ) determined in the A share market.
Formally, the equilibrium price functions are determined by:
where we have suppressed the arguments in the price functions for brevity.
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P a (x a ,φ) is a statistical equilibrium---i.e., over time foreign investors observe many realizations of u a and P a * to learn the joint distribution of u a and P a * and, consequently, the joint distribution of u b and P a * . Based on this knowledge, they will trade and form expectations such that these joint distributions persist over time. We shall now prove that there exists an equilibrium price distribution P a * (x a ,φ) such that u a and P a * are jointly normally distributed and, further, characterize this price distribution.
Proposition 1. 1) Suppose neither domestic nor foreign investors observe φ (i.e., information is symmetric). Then:
where P a0 (.,.), P b0 (.,.) and P c0 (.,.) are the A, B and C share price functions when domestic and foreign investors do not know φ.
2) Suppose domestic investors observe φ, but foreign investors do not. Then:
The expressions for E(u b *P a * ) and Var(u b *P a * ) are derived in the appendix. The pricing equations (22) and (23), without the covariance term, are similar to those in noisy rational expectations model with asymmetric information, such as equations (A7) and (A10) in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) . Further, the pricing equation for the C shares is the same whether there is informational asymmetry in the Chinese market or not. This is because there are no informational linkages between the foreign stock market and the Chinese stock market.
Let the random variable z a , defined in (A13) of the appendix, be a linear transformation of P a . Proposition 2 characterizes the conditions under which the B share prices are at a discount or premium to the A share prices.
2) Suppose domestic investors do not observe φ and cov
Consider part two of Proposition 2 first. Let p a0 and p b0 be particular realizations of the price functions when there is symmetric information. Note that (1), (2) and (3) imply that (19) and (20), the difference in the A and B share prices is:
Suppose cov(u b ,u c ) < 0: i.e., diversification benefits foreign investors. If
e., the supply of A shares is higher than the supply of B shares-true for our sample (appendix II); and domestic investors face at least as much idiosyncratic risk on the domestic asset as foreign investors 9 ), then E(p a0 ) < E(p b0 ). Thus, consistent with earlier models of market segmentation, the B shares trade at a premium when there is no informational asymmetry and foreigners benefit from international diversification. Now, consider part one of Proposition 2. Let p a and p b be particular realizations of the price functions when there is asymmetric information. From (22) and (23), we obtain the following relationship between the market prices of A and B shares:
From (27), whether B shares are traded above or below the price of A shares is determined by: the information asymmetry effect (the first two terms in square brackets) and the diversification effect (the last term). If Cov(ũ b ,ũ c ) = 0, the relative prices of A and B shares are determined purely by the information asymmetry effect, which has two parts: the difference between the conditional expectations of future returns; and the difference between the conditional variances of future returns. The difference arises due to the difference in the conditioning information sets of domestic and foreign investors.
Letting Cov(ũ b ,ũ c ) = 0, and taking expectations on both sides of (27), we show in Appendix I that the average difference in conditional expectations is zero, while the average difference in the conditional variances is positive, if (25) is satisfied. Hence, E(p a ) > E(p b ). (25) is likely to be satisfied if the right hand side of the expression is small, which happens when the variance of the A share price is large. In this case, the A share price is relatively uninformative, and the information asymmetry problem is severe. Intuitively, relative to foreign investors, domestic investors form more precise estimates of the distribution of future returns, and thus require lower expected returns now. = 1-w 1 , w i >0 is the weight and p i is the price of stock B i , i=1,2. We continue to assume that the number of stocks is one in the A and C share markets.
B. The Relative Pricing Model With Index Securities
In Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) , the index security has a lower return variance, and hence the market maker's loss to informed traders is smaller than 18 when individual stocks are traded. As a result, uninformed traders reduce their losses to informed traders by trading an index security, or a basket of securities. It is interesting to see whether such a scenario holds in our model as well. Specifically, do foreign investors trade more B shares, and is the B share discount lower as a result of the B stock index?
Let u I be the unknown future return and n I the number of shares bought or sold of the index security. Let u i be the future return of stock B i , i=1,2. Note that the maximization problem for domestic investors does not change. Hence, the equilibrium price function in the A share market is still given by P a in (22). The market clearing conditions are
Proceeding as before, we can calculate, for each stock B i , i=1,2, the equilibrium price function P i and the shares traded n i as follows:
Proposition 3. The introduction of an index security on B shares makes no difference to: 1) the total number of B shares traded.
2) the price of a B share stock.
At first sight, Proposition 3 might appear to contradict the results of Subrahmanyam (1991) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1993) . This is not so. The difference between our model and those of the other authors is that the A share and B share markets are segmented. Since foreign and domestic investors do not trade together in the B share market, the existence of the 
Comparing (14) and (23) with (30) and (31), we see that, if cov(u b ,u I *P a ) < 0, then investment in B shares is higher and, further, the price of B shares is also higher. In other words, 20 if the A share index allows foreign investors to hedge the risk of trading B shares, they would be willing to invest more and pay a higher price for the B shares.
Proposition 4. Suppose foreign investors could trade an index security on A shares, but not the underlying stocks. If the return on the index security is negatively correlated with the B share return, then, relative to the situation when no index security is available:
1) the total number of B shares traded is higher.
2) the price of a B share stock is higher.
IV. EMPIRICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINESE A AND B SHARE PRICES

A. Sample and Correlations Between Chinese and Foreign Markets
Our sample consists of 39 firms issuing both A and B shares identified from the DATASTEAM database. 10 Of these, 23 firms were listed on the SSE and the remaining 16 on the SZE. Our test period begins in January 1994, the month in which China unified the exchange rate system, in order to minimize any effects arising from the dual exchange rates in effect before that time. The listing dates of the A and B shares and the ownership structure of the sample firms are in Appendix II.
For each pair of class A and B shares, we collect daily prices and trading volume from the DATASTRRAM database. Since A and B shares are traded in different currencies, we convert the Shanghai A share price into US$ and the Shenzhen A share price into HK$, using the Renminbi/US$ and Renminbi/HK$ spot rates respectively. For our sample period, the mean and standard deviation of the exchange rate were 0.1181 (i.e., 100 Yuans = US$11.81) and 0.0023 for US$/Renminbi, and 0.9151 (i.e., 100 Yuan = HK$91.51) and 0.0163 for HK$/Renminbi. Thus, the exchange rates were relatively stable during our sample period, which is not surprising since the HK$ is pegged to the US$ and the Yuan was stabilized at the official exchange rate.
findings are reported in Bailey (1994) . The correlation results indicate that the B share discounts are unlikely to be affected by price change in the foreign stock markets.
Specifically, we find that the Shanghai A share market is highly correlated with the These results indicate that the relative pricing of Chinese A and B shares is not primarily related to the diversification benefits of foreign investors.
B. Lead-Lag Relationship Between A and B Share Returns
To shed light on the information asymmetry between A and B shares, we test whether A share returns lead B share returns. If both A shares and B shares react to the new information in the same manner, we would expect price movements in these two markets to be contemporaneously correlated. On the other hand, if one market reacts to information faster than the other market, we may observe a lead-lag relation.
We use the following functional form to study the lead-lag relationship between A shares and B shares, significant two-day lead coefficients. In contrast, no stock has a significant one-day lag coefficient, but 4 stocks have significant two-day lag coefficients. The null hypothesis is rejected for 8 stocks for the lead coefficients, and only 3 stocks for the lag coefficients.
A similar pattern is observed for the Shenzhen stock exchange. 50 percent of the stocks have significant lead coefficients for one-day lead, while only 12 percent of lag coefficients are significant for one-day lag. The F-statistics indicate that, for 11 out of 16 stocks, the null hypothesis that all the lead coefficients are jointly zero is rejected. In the case of lag coefficients, the F-statistics reject the null hypothesis for only 3 out of the 16 stocks in Shenzhen.
C. Foreign Media Coverage Impact
One way to analyze information asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors is to look at the impact of English media coverage. 12 For B share investors, the English media report is an important source of information, since firms with wide coverage in the media may be easier to monitor, reducing informational asymmetries between domestic and foreign investors.
Hence, we conjecture that firms with greater media coverage will have lower price discounts for their B shares compared to firms with lower publicity.
To measure the degree of the English media coverage, we count the number of times a firm is mentioned in the headline of an article reported in the English newspapers. Specifically, 12 We thank Stephen Brown for this suggestion.
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we search the Wall Street Journal Index through the Dow Jones Information Retrieval Service for the years 1995 to 1996, and count all citations for each firm. Then we rank firms based upon the amount of news coverage and the magnitude of B share discount, and compute the rank correlation between the two series. 
D. Cross-Sectional Tests of the Determinants of B Share Discounts
Our theoretical model implies a relationship between the A share and B share prices, as given by (27). We first express (27) in a form amenable to empirical testing. Define ∆p = (1+r f )(p a -p b ). We show in the appendix that ∆p can be expressed as: To test the model, we form empirical proxies for the right-hand side variables in (33) to capture the cross-sectional variation in the B share discounts. Recall that z a is simply a linear transformation of the A share price. We show in the appendix that ∆p, the price discount on B 13 The rank correlation was not significant for the whole sample, and therefore was not reported. For empirical investigation, it is convenient to rewrite (33) in the following form. For stock i, i=1,...39, we write:
where DIS = the average daily discount of the B share prices, where the daily discount for stock i on day t is D it =(P ait -P bit )/P ait , with P ait and P bit being the A and B share prices, respectively. We also include firm size (SIZE) and an exchange dummy variable (D) in the regression.
SIZE is the market capitalization of the firm (i.e., the number of A shares times the A share price, plus the number of B shares times the B share price). SIZE is widely used to explain stock returns in the finance literature, and may act as another proxy for information asymmetry (for example, more analysts may follow larger firms). D takes on the value 1 when the stock is traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, and zero on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. From our earlier results, the B share discounts are higher for Shanghai, and so we expect the dummy coefficient to be positive.
We estimate equation (34) using OLS. Table 7 Model 4 uses the entire set of explanatory variables, and explains 67 percent of the cross-sectional variance of the B share discounts. All estimated coefficients have the right sign and are significant at the 1 percent level, except for the coefficients on SBA and SBF, which are not significant. The two proxies for informational asymmetry, VARB and INFO, are significant and of the predicted signs. The negative and significant sign on SIZE also provide additional support for the information asymmetry hypothesis. Supply factors, proxied here by the relative supply of A shares, is also important. The coefficient on this variable is negative and significant, consistent with the results of Chen and Su (1998) . Overall, these results provide strong support for the information asymmetry hypothesis, as well as the predictions of our theoretical model.
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Although information asymmetry and market microstructure factors explain 67 percent of the cross-sectional variance in the B share discounts, the highly significant intercept term indicates that other variables may have added explanatory power. This is not surprising, given the large magnitude of the observed discounts in the B share prices. Factors such as political and economic risks, foreign and domestic investor sentiments may also play roles in determining the B share discounts. This is an avenue for future research.
V. CONCLUSION
Contrary to evidence that foreigner investors pay higher prices than domestic investors for local shares in other countries, we find that, in the Chinese stock markets, foreign class B shares trade at an average discount of about 60 percent to the prices at which domestic A shares trade. The usual diversification argument cannot explain this phenomenon.
We argue that one reason for the discount is that foreign investors have less information about local firms, relative to domestic investors. We develop a simple model, incorporating both asymmetric information and market segmentation, to explain the relative pricing of A shares and B shares. Our model predicts that, whether cross-listing leads to premia or discounts in trading of the foreign class shares, depends on the relative magnitudes of the information asymmetry effect and the diversification effect. The former effect leads to discounts for B shares, while the latter effect implies a premia for B shares. Our model identifies proxies for informational asymmetry, that we later use for our empirical tests. Finally, we show theoretically that introduction of an index security on the domestic A shares, that can be traded by foreign investors, improves the liquidity of the B share market. 30 We show empirically that the information asymmetry hypothesis provides a significant, though partial, explanation as to why the B shares consistently trade at lower prices than the A shares. First, we find that A share returns are more likely to lead B share returns, rather than the reverse. Second, the B share price discount on a stock is negatively related to its coverage in the English media. Finally, using a cross-sectional regression, we show that the B share discount is significantly related to a proxy for informational asymmetry that is based on our model, and to the media coverage variable. Together with an exchange dummy, and a stock's size (i.e., its market capitalization), the information asymmetry proxies explain 67 per cent of the crosssectional variance of B share price discounts.
Although we analyze the discount/premium in the Chinese stock markets, the results generalize to other cross-listed securities where informational asymmetry is a major factor. Of course, our focus on the information effect does not rule out other factors that could explain B share discounts. For example, the B share discounts could be caused by irrationally high domestic demand for the A shares, or foreign investors' sentiment towards the Chinese stocks.
The interest rate differential between the domestic and foreign markets is another factor that may influence the level of the discounts. Our model has abstracted from these factors, but they remain important areas for further study. 
The expected utility function of domestic investors can be expressed as:
Taking the derivative of (A2) with respect to n a ,
Set (A3) equal to zero to get (10).
Derivation of foreign investors' demand functions.
The expected utility function of foreign investors is:
where 
Taking the derivative of (A4) with respect to n b and n c :
Setting (A6) equal to zero and solving for n b, we get (14). Setting (A7) equal to zero and solving for n c we get (15).
Proof of Proposition 1
1) Solving for p a from (10), we have:
If domestic investors do not observe φ, then they know only the unconditional mean and variances of the A share returns E(u a ) and Var(u a ). Using this fact, together with the condition that supply equals demand, we obtain (19).
Solving for p b from (14), we have:
If domestic investors do not observe φ, then P a * is pure noise, and foreign investors know only the unconditional mean and variances of the B share returns E(u b ) and Var(u b ). This fact, together with the market clearing conditions (17) and (18) give (20).
There is no asymmetric information in the C share market. Hence, the form of the price function is the same as in (20), provided we switch subscript b for subscript c, and vice versa, wherever they occur. This gives us (21).
2) Combining (A8) with the market clearing condition (16) gives us (22).
In (A9), make the substitution P a * = P a , where P a is the market clearing price function defined in (22) . Using the market clearing conditions (17) and (18) 
We note that E(φ)=E(u a )=E(u b ). Then, from (A10), (1), (2) and (22) we obtain:
(24) follows from the fact that there is no asymmetric information in the C share market.
Proof of Proposition 2
Define the random variable z a as follows:
Thus, z a is a linear transformation of P a .
1) Consider (27) . From (A11), the difference in conditional expectations is:
Using (A13), we can rewrite (A14) as follows:
From (A12) and (A13), the difference in the conditional variances is:
We 
The expectation of (A15) is zero because E(z a ) =E(φ). The expectation of (A17) is positive if the condition in Proposition 2 is satisfied. Thus, E(p a ) > E(p b ).
Derivation of foreign investors' demand functions with index securities
The budget constraints of the foreign investors are: 
Substituting (A20) in (A4) and then taking the derivative with respect to n i gives us (28).
Solving (28) for p i and substituting the market clearing conditions ,2,I,c, gives us (29) .
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Proof of Proposition 3
Suppose there were no index securities. Then the demand n i for security i by the foreign investor is given by:
Note that the right-hand-sides of both (28) without the index security, is the same. Hence, from (29) and the market clearing condition, the price levels p i is the same also.
Proof of Proposition 4
The budget constraints of the foreign investors are:
The expected utility function of foreign investors is still (A4) with: 
Derivation of Equation ( 33)
From (27), (A15) and (A16), we get: The third equality in (A25) follows from the definitions of P a and z a in (22) The average discounts for B shares are calculated as the daily mean of D it =(P ait -P bit )/P ait , where, for stock i on day t, P ait and P bit are the A and B share prices, respectively. The sample consists of 39 stocks with both A and B shares, of which 23 are listed in Shanghai, and 16 in the Shenzhen stock exchange. The sample period is January 1994 through December 1996.
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